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| TTP and BLA: Security Guarantees for Afghanistan and India | |
By Fatima Baloch
The religious insurgent group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged in 2007 amid the Afghan Taliban’s resistance against U.S. and NATO forces. Simultaneously, it launched a campaign against Pakistan’s military establishment, aiming to dismantle the military-dominated state, overthrow its controlled democracy, and establish an Islamic Sharia-based government modeled after the Afghan Taliban—known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA). Its vision: a corruption-free, justice-oriented Islamic Pakistan.
Meanwhile, in Balochistan, the secular Baloch nation continues its struggle for independence under the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), seeking to establish a sovereign, secular republic. Though ideologically divergent—one religious, the other secular—both TTP and BLA pursue objectives that inadvertently serve the long-term security interests of Afghanistan and India.
Pakistan’s Legacy of Proxy Warfare
From its “bleed India with a thousand cuts” doctrine to its pursuit of “strategic depth” in Afghanistan and alignment with U.S. policies against Iran, Pakistan has consistently weaponized terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. Its history of betrayal toward Afghanistan—through factionalization, political interference, and regime destabilization—has made the TTP and BLA enduring security buffers for Kabul.
Islamabad has long viewed a strong, independent, and nationalist Afghanistan as a strategic threat. Such a government could revive Pashtun nationalism, challenge the legitimacy of the Durand Line, and support Baloch separatism—threatening Pakistan’s territorial integrity from both the west (Pashtunistan) and the south (Balochistan).
To preempt this, Pakistan adopted a policy of deep interference in Afghan affairs. In the 1970s, it supported opposition groups against King Zahir Shah and President Daud Khan. Backed by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and other Cold War allies, Pakistan played a central role in undermining successive Afghan governments.
During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), Pakistan—under military and financial support from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia—trained thousands of Mujahideen fighters. Its goals were clear: earn dollars, acquire free weapons, become a nuclear state, and weaken Afghanistan. Even after the 1988 Geneva Accords and Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan continued destabilizing Afghanistan—launching attacks on Jalalabad through Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s faction to topple Dr. Najibullah’s government. The resulting civil war devastated the country and displaced millions.
In 1994–96, Pakistan backed the rise of the TTA—largely composed of madrassa students from Pakistan—replacing Hekmatyar, once its protégé. Through religious manipulation, Islamabad reshaped Pashtun identity, turning secular nationalists into radicalized pro-Pakistan elements, known in Pashtun society as “Gul Khan.”
Post-9/11 Shifts and the Rise of TTP
After 9/11, Pakistan allied with the U.S. and NATO, gaining Non-NATO ally status and substantial aid. While publicly fighting the TTA under the “do more” policy, it simultaneously provided airbases and logistics to NATO—resulting in the deaths of thousands of Afghans. During this period, the TTP emerged, ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban.
Following the TTA’s return to power on August 15, 2021, under the Doha Agreement, the TTP was emboldened to replicate their success. Afghanistan—home to Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, and Baloch tribes—found relative stability under TTA rule. Unlike previous monarchist, communist, or externally imposed regimes, the Taliban’s governance aligns more closely with tribal and Islamic values. They have curbed corruption, restored law and order, ensured justice under Islamic law, and reasserted sovereignty—earning legitimacy, especially in rural areas. Recent clashes between Afghan forces and remnants of foreign-backed militias have further boosted the TTA’s popularity among ordinary Afghans.
Afghanistan’s development under Taliban leadership challenges Pakistan’s traditional security calculus. The TTA understands that to prevent U.S. influence and Pakistani military interference in Afghan affairs—and to avoid internal fragmentation—it must support the TTP’s goal of establishing an Islamic, pro-Afghanistan government in Pakistan and back the Baloch struggle for a Greater Afghanistan, historically known as Loy Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s Military Fatigue and Escalation
Karma has returned in the form of the TTP and BLA. Pakistan now faces the same fate it once inflicted on Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s—and on India through proxy wars.
Years of guerrilla warfare have left the Pakistan Army fatigued and ineffective—reminiscent of the Afghan National Army’s collapse under Ashraf Ghani. In desperation, Pakistan launched a full-scale military campaign against Afghanistan on October 14–15, 2025, targeting civilians and infrastructure, and closing trade routes—further crippling Afghanistan’s economy. The objective: to internationalize its internal conflicts and coerce the Afghan Taliban into fighting Pakistan’s war against the ideologically aligned TTP.
China, Qatar, Iran, and Saudi Arabia intervened diplomatically to prevent escalation. A ceasefire brokered by Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia was placed, but during peace talks in Doha and Istanbul, Pakistan desperately tried to pressure the Afghan Taliban into fighting its war against the TTP and BLA. The Taliban, however, briefed hosts on Pakistan’s two-decade role as a frontline ally of U.S./NATO, its continued provision of military bases, and its covert support for ISIS. They also clarified the origins of TTP and BLA as internal Pakistani factions and demanded guarantees that no U.S. drones flying from Pakistan would violate Afghan sovereignty. Pakistan failed to justify its aggression and withdrew from negotiations.
Conclusion and Strategic Outlook
With peace efforts failing, Pakistan’s attempts—via China and Turkey—to pressure Kabul into acting against the TTP and BLA are unlikely to succeed. The Taliban are unwilling to fight their ideological brethren, the TTP. Doing so risks internal divisions, public backlash, and potential civil war—an outcome Pakistan may exploit.
TTP and BLA attacks are at their peak. A war between Afghanistan and Pakistan appears imminent. Pakistan’s campaign aims to crush these groups, but Afghanistan’s history of resisting foreign domination suggests it will not yield. Islamabad may escalate deeper into Afghan territory, risking full-scale war.
There is also a growing risk of confrontation with India from Sir Creek—either to rally domestic support, distract from internal instability, or seek sympathy from Islamic countries.
India and Afghanistan must strengthen military cooperation—sharing weapons, air defense systems, and jointly confronting Pakistan through Operation Sindoor 2.0. India should prepare contingency plans, including reclaiming Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) before a potential collapse of the Pakistani state, ensuring India becomes a contiguous neighbor of Afghanistan and gains direct access to Central Asian republics.
If extremist groups like the TTP seize control of nuclear assets, the threat becomes exponentially more dangerous. The U.S. and Western powers must act to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal before it falls into jihadist hands.
India should formally recognize the Afghan Taliban, as Russia has done, and deepen coordination with Kabul. New Delhi must also engage secular Baloch nationalists—especially BLA leadership—and support the establishment of a free, independent Balochistan. Simultaneously, India should encourage Afghanistan to absorb Pakistan’s Pashtun province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), merging it into a Greater Afghanistan. This would secure long-term stability for both India and Afghanistan.
India has no option but to resume Operation Sindoor 2.0—in support of Greater Afghanistan and a free Balochistan.
About the Author
Fatima Baloch is a senior geopolitical and regional expert who writes extensively on Afghanistan, Balochistan, and India, with a focus on strategic dynamics and regional security.
Disclaimer: The views, observations and opinions expressed in above write up of Scoop News are strictly author's own. Scoop News does not take any onus or liability for the veracity, accuracy, validity, completeness, suitability of any of information in the above given write up. The information, facts or figures appearing in the write up in no way manifest the position, standpoint or stance of Scoop News and the Scoop News does not assume any encumbrance or answerability of the same. All disputes are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of competent Courts and Forums in Jammu City Only.
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