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| Pakistan’s Failed War in Afghanistan | |
By Fatima Baloch
Following the devastating Afghan civil war in 1992—engineered by Pakistan’s ISI through support for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, notoriously known as the "Butcher of Kabul"—Afghanistan plunged into chaos as Mujahideen factions fought for control of Kabul, driven by greed for power. In 1994, Pakistan launched the Afghan Taliban, establishing a government that was notably pro-Pakistan. Islamabad proudly considered Afghanistan its strategic depth against India, transforming the country into a hub for global terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and anti-India Punjabi groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan turned against the Afghan Taliban and allied with the U.S. and NATO in the global war on terror, gaining Non-NATO ally status and receiving substantial aid and development packages. Over the next two decades, Pakistan not only directly fought the Afghan Taliban under the "do more" policy but also provided military support, airbases, and logistics to NATO and U.S. forces—resulting in the deaths of thousands of Afghans. During this period, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged, ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban. Following the Taliban’s return to power on August 15, 2021—under the Doha Agreement—the TTP was emboldened to replicate the Taliban’s success and defeat the Pakistan Army.
Today, nuclear-armed Pakistan faces a convergence of internal and external threats that mirror the fragmentation of 1971. In Balochistan, the secular Baloch nation continues its fight for independence under the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), seeking to establish a secular republic. Meanwhile, the TTP has gained significant ground in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), defeating Pakistani forces and aiming to replace the current pseudo-democratic Islamic Republic with an Afghan Taliban-style sharia regime.
The military’s popularity has plummeted in Punjab—once its most loyal province—especially after the April 10, 2022 vote of no-confidence against PTI and the imprisonment of its most popular civilian leader, Imran Khan. The crackdown on Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a previously favored hardline religious party used by the military to justify its actions in Balochistan and KPK, has further alienated key segments of society. These developments have eroded public support for the Pakistan Army’s campaigns against the TTP and other militant groups. Simultaneously, Pakistan grapples with severe economic instability and political disarray.
Despite efforts to suppress the BLA and TTP insurgencies—suffering heavy casualties and the loss of high-ranking officers in routine ambushes—the Pakistan Army has failed. Years of conflict and politicized leadership have left the military exhausted and ineffective. The institution now teeters on collapse, reminiscent of the Afghan National Army’s downfall under Ashraf Ghani. If Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal falls into the hands of jihadist groups like the TTP, the global threat would be catastrophic—especially for India, Israel, and the United States.
In desperation, Pakistan launched a full-scale military campaign against Afghanistan, targeting civilian infrastructure and populations. The objective: to force Kabul to fight Pakistan’s war against the TTP, Lashkar-e-Islam, and the BLA—or face continued aggression. This strategy aims to internationalize Pakistan’s internal conflicts, hoping regional powers like China, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States will pressure the Afghan Taliban to act against insurgents allegedly sheltered in Afghanistan.
Following two days of intense fighting along the Durand Line (October 14–15, 2025), Qatar brokered a ceasefire and invited defense ministers and national security advisors to Doha to negotiate a permanent peace framework. However, the ceasefire was quickly violated by Pakistani airstrikes targeting Afghan domestic cricketers and civilian homes in Paktika and Barmal provinces.
Pakistani officials have openly stated that the TTP and other anti-state groups are ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has effectively shifted its internal war into Afghan territory, demanding the Taliban guarantee an end to TTP attacks—or face further escalation. In response, the Afghan Taliban have repeatedly asserted that JeM and LeT have shifted operations to Pakistani Punjab and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), and that the TTP and BLA insurgencies are Pakistan’s internal matters. They have also accused Pakistan of supporting ISIS against Afghanistan. The Taliban have refused to fight Pakistan’s war and are expected to reiterate this stance in Doha. Under diplomatic and financial pressure from China, Qatar, and other Arab nations, Pakistan may be forced to halt its aggression.
Ultimately, the TTP and its associated groups are likely to intensify attacks within Pakistan, pushing the country further into chaos and military defeat. Pakistan’s attempt to force the Afghan Taliban into its internal conflict is likely to fail—just as its previous military ventures did: Operation Gibraltar in 1965 to occupy Jammu & Kashmir, the 1971 war to avoid disintegration, and the 1998 Kargil conflict to seize Siachen. Pakistan’s history is marked by repeated military failures.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s military campaign in Afghanistan is designed to force the TTP and BLA into submission. However, Afghanistan’s long history of resisting foreign influence—from the Soviets to NATO—suggests it will not comply. Islamabad may escalate operations deeper into Afghan territory, risking a full-scale war.
There is also a growing possibility that Pakistan will provoke a confrontation with India—either to rally domestic support, distract from internal instability, or internationalize the conflict. This would mirror past attempts, such as the bombing of Srinagar military bases and the Battle of Longewala in the 1971 war, aimed at drawing international attention.
In this context, India and Afghanistan must strengthen their military cooperation. This includes sharing weapons and air defense systems, and jointly confronting Pakistan’s military through Operation Sindoor 2.0—engaging Pakistan on the eastern front in support of Afghanistan.
India should prepare contingency plans, including a calibrated expansion of Operation Sindoor 2.0—not only to safeguard its national interests but also to reclaim Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) before a potential collapse of the Pakistani state. If extremist groups like the TTP gain control of a nuclear-armed Pakistan, the threat would become significantly more dangerous and unpredictable. The insurgencies are expected to persist, with continued attacks on Pakistani military installations and the potential collapse of the Pakistan Army. Before jihadist groups conquer Islamabad, the U.S. and Western powers must act to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to prevent it from falling into extremist hands.
India should formally recognize the Afghan Taliban, as Russia has done, and deepen coordination with Kabul. New Delhi must also engage with secular Baloch nationalists—especially the BLA leadership—and support the establishment of a free, independent Balochistan. This would enhance long-term security for both India and Afghanistan.
(The author is a Baloch scholar and researcher in a foreign country)
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