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| From Holy Guest to Namak Haram – Disloyal Afghans | | 
By Fatima Baloch
For Pakistan, a strong, independent, and nationalist Afghanistan has long been perceived as a strategic threat. Islamabad feared that such a government could reignite Pashtun nationalism—reviving calls for an independent Pashtunistan or a merger with Afghanistan—challenge the legitimacy of the Durand Line, and potentially support Baloch separatism. This would threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity from both the west (Pashtunistan) and the south (Balochistan).
Pakistan understood that a politically stable, militarily capable, and economically developed Afghanistan would pose an existential threat—potentially leading to further disintegration, as witnessed in 1971. To preempt this, Islamabad adopted a long-standing policy of interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, exploiting nearly every phase of the country’s instability and supporting anti-government insurgents. Backed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Western allies during the Cold War, Pakistan played a central role in undermining successive Afghan governments. In the 1970s, it supported opposition groups against King Zahir Shah and later President Daud Khan, fueling factionalism and destruction.
During the Soviet intervention (1979–1989), Pakistan became a key conduit for U.S. and Saudi funding to the Mujahideen. Its objectives were clear: earn dollars, acquire free weapons, and weaken Afghanistan politically and militarily. A fragile Afghanistan served Pakistan’s strategic interests. Billions in U.S. aid, Saudi riyals, and modern weaponry flowed into Pakistan. Under the guise of refugee support, Pakistani generals and elites profited immensely from UNHCR and global NGOs. Afghan refugees were labeled “guests of Allah” and “holy refugees,” but were exploited as proxy fighters against their homeland. Many—tribal, ill-educated, and vulnerable—were manipulated by the Pakistani military, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia.
After the Soviet withdrawal in 1987 and the fall of the communist regime in 1992, Pakistan backed specific Mujahideen factions—particularly Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s—fueling a brutal civil war that devastated Afghanistan. Thousands of Afghans fled to the Middle East, Europe, Iran, and Central Asia in miserable conditions. Meanwhile, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and other powers abandoned the Afghan people, treating them as disposable assets.
In 1996, Pakistan supported the rise of the Taliban—formed largely from students of Pakistani madrassas—who seized control of most of Afghanistan, replacing Hekmatyar, Islamabad’s former protégé. Pakistan not only influenced political outcomes but also sought to reshape Pashtun identity—transforming secular, moderate, and nationalist anti-Pakistan elements into religiously radicalized, pro-Pakistan forces, known in Pashtun society as “Gul Khan.” This served Islamabad’s strategic goals.
These interventions came at a devastating cost. Decades of war, foreign meddling, and civil strife destroyed Afghanistan’s infrastructure, displaced millions, and left deep psychological scars. Pakistan’s “strategic depth” doctrine—using influence over Afghan territory to secure its western flank—ensured Afghanistan remained militarily weak, politically unstable, and dependent.
After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan turned against the Afghan Taliban and allied with the U.S. and NATO in the global war on terror, gaining Non-NATO ally status and receiving substantial aid. Over the next two decades, Pakistan fought the Afghan Taliban under the “do more” policy while simultaneously providing military support, airbases, and logistics to NATO and U.S. forces—resulting in the deaths of thousands of Afghans. During this period, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged, ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban.
Following the Afghan Taliban 2.0’s return to power on August 15, 2021—under the Doha Agreement—the TTP was emboldened to replicate the Taliban’s success and challenge the Pakistan Army. Today, nuclear-armed Pakistan faces a convergence of internal and external threats reminiscent of 1971. In Balochistan, the secular Baloch nation continues its fight for independence under the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), seeking to establish a secular republic. Meanwhile, the TTP has gained significant ground in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), defeating Pakistani forces and aiming to replace the pseudo-democratic Islamic Republic with an Afghan Taliban-style sharia government.
To counter the TTP and BLA insurgencies, Pakistan has desperately pressured the Afghan Taliban to take strong action against insurgent leadership allegedly sheltered in Afghanistan. In this effort, Pakistan has resorted to both military and non-military tactics—such as expelling Afghan refugees once hailed as “holy guests” and blocking transit routes to financially damage Afghanistan’s economy.
Many Afghans today do not view Pakistan as a friendly neighbor but rather as a long-time manipulator of their national destiny. The repeated denial of Afghanistan’s sovereignty and identity has fueled enduring resentment, distrust, and hostility.
The grueling guerrilla campaigns have left the Pakistan Army exhausted and ineffective. The institution now teeters on collapse, reminiscent of the Afghan National Army’s downfall under Ashraf Ghani. In desperation, Pakistan launched a full-scale military campaign against Afghanistan on October 14–15, 2025, targeting civilian infrastructure and populations, and closing trade routes—further damaging Afghanistan’s war-torn economy. During this campaign, Pakistan’s ISPR released a provocative song titled “Namak Haram,” aimed at Afghanistan.
Ironically, the song implies betrayal by Afghanistan, despite Pakistan’s own history of supporting tribal elders and militant factions against stable Afghan governments—leading to the destruction of once well-developed Afghan cities and making the country dependent on Pakistan. In contrast, India has consistently supported Afghan governments in the fields of health, education, infrastructure, and agriculture—winning the trust and admiration of the Afghan people.
Pakistan achieved its 1980s strategic objectives. But karma has returned in the form of the TTP and BLA. Pakistan now faces the same fate Afghanistan endured during the 1980s and the civil war of 1992–1996.
Pakistan continues to attack Afghanistan in an attempt to internationalize its internal conflicts, hoping regional powers like China, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States will pressure the Afghan Taliban to act against insurgents allegedly sheltered in Afghanistan. Pakistani officials have openly stated that the TTP and other anti-state groups are ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has effectively shifted its internal war into Afghan territory, demanding that the Taliban guarantee an end to TTP attacks—or face further escalation.
Unlike previous regimes—monarchist, communist, or externally imposed pseudo-democracies—the current Taliban-led government has brought relative stability to Afghanistan. As a tribal and Islamic society, many Afghans perceive the Taliban’s governance model as more closely aligned with their cultural and religious values. The regime has curbed corruption, restored law and order, and reasserted national sovereignty—earning a degree of legitimacy and popular support, particularly in rural areas. Under Taliban leadership, Afghanistan is undergoing rapid development—a trajectory that challenges Pakistan’s traditional security calculus.
Conclusion and Future Outcomes
Qatar and Turkey have been struggling to broker a permanent peace deal between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban-led government. Turkey, favoring Pakistan, continues to pressure Kabul to act against the TTP and BLA—but this approach is unlikely to yield positive results.
A war between Afghanistan and Pakistan appears increasingly likely. The Afghan Taliban are unlikely to fight Pakistan’s war against their ideological brethren, the TTP. Doing so would risk internal divisions within the Taliban leadership, provoke anger among ordinary Afghans, and potentially ignite a civil war within Afghanistan—an outcome Pakistan may seek to exploit.
Pakistan’s military campaign is designed to force the TTP and BLA into submission. However, Afghanistan’s long history of resisting foreign domination—from the Soviets to NATO—suggests it will not comply. Islamabad may escalate operations deeper into Afghan territory, risking a full-scale war.
There is also a growing possibility that Pakistan will provoke a confrontation with India—either to rally domestic support, distract from internal instability, or internationalize the conflict. This would mirror past attempts, such as the bombing of Srinagar military bases and the Battle of Longewala during the 1971 war.
In this context, India and Afghanistan must strengthen their military cooperation. This includes sharing weapons and air defense systems, and jointly confronting Pakistan’s military through Operation Sindoor 2.0—engaging Pakistan on the eastern front in support of Afghanistan.
India should prepare contingency plans, including a calibrated expansion of Operation Sindoor 2.0—not only to safeguard its national interests but also to reclaim Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) before a potential collapse of the Pakistani state. If extremist groups like the TTP gain control of a nuclear-armed Pakistan, the threat would become significantly more dangerous and unpredictable. The insurgencies are expected to persist, with continued attacks on Pakistani military installations and the potential collapse of the Pakistan Army. Before jihadist groups conquer Islamabad, the U.S. and Western powers must act to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to prevent it from falling into extremist hands.
India should formally recognize the Afghan Taliban, as Russia has done, and deepen coordination with Kabul. New Delhi must also engage with secular Baloch nationalists—especially the BLA leadership—and support the establishment of a free, independent Balochistan. This would enhance long-term security for both India and Afghanistan.
India has no option but to resume Operation Sindoor 2.0 in favor of Greater Afghanistan and a free Balochistan.
About the Author:
Fatima Baloch is a senior geopolitical and regional expert who writes extensively on Afghanistan, Balochistan, and India, with a focus on regional dynamics.
(Disclaimer: The views, observations and opinions expressed in above write up of Scoop News are strictly author's own. Scoop News does not take any onus or liability for the veracity, accuracy, validity, completeness, suitability of any of information in the above given write up. The information, facts or figures appearing in the write up in no way manifest the position, standpoint or stance of Scoop News and the Scoop News does not assume any encumbrance or answerability of the same. All disputes are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of competent Courts and Forums in Jammu City Only)
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